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THE REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL
I

The lower classes in Portugal, particularly in the country,
are as hard working, sober, peaceable, and well-mannered a people
as one could hope to find. They are, however, incredibly ignorant. To me it was a joy and wonder to find in Lisbon that the
servants could not tell time by the clock, and that they thought
the French tongue was merely an impediment of speech. I twas
a temptation never before dreamed of and triumphantly endured,
to discover that the washerwoman would accept with childlike
faith whatever was offered her because she could not count
money. As for reading and writing, they are -to these simple
people something like miracles of cleverness.
This picturesque ignorance one finds at first merely diverting,
as an unexpected example of artistic perfection; but unfortunately
when accompanied by its inevitable shadow, extreme poverty,
it produces that lethargy and passivity which underlies the
tragedy of the history of Portugal. In the absence of a highly
developed industry these peasants form the great majority of the
Portuguese nation; but they are politically negligible. In as far
as they are anything they are monarchists, submissive to the
Church; but they have had no influence upon recent events. The
revolution in Portugal follows the general rule in being the work
of an active minority concentrated in the towns. In Portugal, as
elsewhere, it is the minority which is politically effective.
In extraordinary contrast to these simple, docile peasants,
the upper classes in Lisbon are undeniably clever. They are
distinguished by an impatient mental alertness. They perceive
in a flash and turn quickly to other things. In linguistic ability
they are second only to the Poles and the Russians. They are
bilingual to such an extent that French literature is a serious
detriment to the development of their own. One is safe in
assuming that an educated Portuguese speaks French; he probably speaks it fluently and without foreign accent. They are all
deeply impregnated with French art and philosophy, and French
influence is seen in everything they do. Yet this is but a successful veneer; for in temperament and character they are not French
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at all, but rather more akin to the Italians. They are excellent
musicians and superb orators, bu~ as administrators they are
not eminent. They co-operate badly and are prone to factions.
Foreigners complain of a certain vanity, which is, however, but
superficial. Beneath the surface there lurks an ill-concealed
distrust of themselves and of one another. They know that they
lack persistence and that they are easily discouraged. Like the
Poles they are a ready prey to dejection and melancholy.
All this explains in part why the Portuguese mismanage their
politics. The political virtues, says Bagehot, are the stupid ones.
In Portugal stupidity is the monopoly of the unpolitical classes.
The political classes are volatile; the others, immovable. Portugal, like so many small countries, is a land of violent contrasts.
The golden mean is lacking, which in constitutional government
signifies a preponderant and self-respecting middle class. Parliamentary institutions, the product of English social conditions,
have worked badly among them. In times of political crisis
the English hold public meetings; the Portuguese choose a
dictator.
It is perhaps unnecessary to explain that this small intellectual class is itself not a unit. It has many social nuances and
cleavages, among which that between the aristocracy on the one
hand and a part of the professional classes on the other, is sufficiently marked to have political consequences.
The aristocracy of Portugal is an old and distinguished one.
Disraeli, an expert in such matters, was proud to trace an imaginary descent to this source. Under an absolute ruler raised
from their ranks, the government of the country was for centuries
their monopoly, and they acquired vast estates which were
entailed and inalienable. Early in the nineteenth century these
entails were broken. Their property was dissipated and their
political monopoly destroyed. Though a small body closely
related by intermarriage, they have not the arrogant pride of
the English aristocracy, to which on the whole they are not
inferior. Owing to their traditional attachment to the monarchy
and the Church, this admirable and unspoilt element finds itself
in irreconcilable conflict with the new repUblic. So many have
gone abroad that they form a body of political emigres very irritating to the repUblicans at home, not dissimilar to the French noblesse during the French Revolution. The revolution has resulted
for the time being in the complete loss of their political power.
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I t is from the second, the professional class, that the leaders
of the revolution have arisen. They are lawyers, journalists,
physicians, and university men, inferior to the aristocracy in
traditions of culture, but not in intelligence, or perhaps in wealth.
They are illuminati, positivists in philosophy, and anti-clerical.
With them is associated a not particularly admirable bourgeoisie.
As the Russian constitutionalists look to England for inspiration.
they look to France. French republicanism is their ideal. Unlike the English gentry who assumed parliamentary control in
1640, they have had no political training, especially in matters
of administration and public finance. What they knew about
politics they learned in the school of journalistic opposition.
They have intrigued in the Cortes, written seditious articles, and
gone to prison. The rest was theory.
From this political and administrative inexperience flow two
of the three serious difficulties now threatening the republic;
namely, the continuation of the financial disorder and the quarrel
with the Catholic Church. It was disorganised finances more
than any other cause that brought about the revolution, and it is
here that the revolution has least justified itself. The republic
has produced a master of political manipulation, but not a minister of finance. As to the religious difficulty, it is possible that
an ultimate quarrel could not have been avoided with a body so
tenacious of its privileges as the clergy; but it might easily have
been moderated or postponed. These inexperienced and doctrinaire politicians have followed naively the pattern of French
revolutions and have acted as though anti-clericalism were a
sufficient programme for a new republic.
The third difficulty arises inevitably out of the nature of the
revolution itself. For this revolution, unlike those in LatinAmerican countries, is not a mere transference of power from one
small class of the community to another. Nor is it merely an
anti-monarchical and anti-clerical revolt. It is a social and
political uprising of the labouring classes in the towns, particularly in Lisbon, against the double pressure of crushing taxes and
nSlng prices. It is a social upheaval, a serious attempt to erect
a democracy upon that unpromising foundation, the disorganised
working classes of Lisbon.
It should be said parenthetically that Lisbon plays a r~le in
this revolution similar to that of London in the Puritan revolution and Paris in the French revolutions. In fact it may almost
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be said that Lisbon is the revolution. As in France, the Latin
traditions of centralisation a~e strong, and so important a city as
Oporto dare not remove a rock from the Douro without the
previous consent of the metropolis. Lisbon is republican.
Without it there would have been no republic and without it the
republic would disappear like morning mist. We must, therefore,
consider briefly the social conditions and the mental traits of this
awakening class, the labourers of the Portuguese capital.
These labourers show few traces of the unconscious selfreliance and well-fed aggressiveness of the American democracy.
They have, in general, a high degree of manual skill; but they are
poor, deferential to their superiors, and hitherto they have shown
no faculty for co-operation, which as a matter of fact was practically forbidden under the monarchy. A young Englishman in
the employ of the Lisbon telephone company told me that their
workmen constantly made repairs which in England were never
done outside the factory. He thought them admirable in work
requiring nicety and perfection of detail. They are not wholly
illiterate like the peasants; but it is significant that until recently
socialist doctrines have found few adherents among them.
Since the revolution one hears of socialist and even of syndicalist
groups. Their political impotence has arisen from their lack of
aggressiveness and cohesion, which in tum arises from their
poverty.
Notwithstanding the rapid rise of factories in Lisbon and
Oporto in recent years, Portuguese industry is still largely carried
on in small shops without elaborate machinery, after the manner
sometimes known as arts and crafts. Lisbon workmen in certain
trades-as jewelry, tile making, and carving-have been famous
for centuries. Their traditions, derived from Moorish times,
have survived the earthquake, repeated revolutions, and a longcontinued national poverty. Certain characteristics of this
manufacture are wholly admirable. Its products are not standardised according to the American practice. A special order and
a variation in the product are not to them an annoyance and an
expense, but a source of interest. A new order presents a new
problem, and in so far the product is an artistic achievement.
All this would have delighted the heart of William Morris; but
it is accompanied by a drawback which I fear he did not fully
realise. Except for articles of mode in which price is subordinate,
the returns for such labour are necessarily meagre. I never tired
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of pausing in the doorways of these shops to watch the workmen,
often with deep respect for the perfection of their skill; but the
marks of poverty were only too deeply stamped upon them.
The first introduction of factories does not lead to an immediate improvement in the conditions of labour. It did not in
England during the eighteenth century, and it does not now either
in Russia or Portugal. Under the monarchy few laws regulating
the condition of labour were passed, and those few were carelessly
enforced. Portugal was in this respect one of the most backward
countries of Europe. The laws controlling the formation of
labour unions were so restrictive as to be prohibitory in practice.
As for strikes, they were simply forbidden.
An English agent of the Lisbon tramway tells me that their
employees are the highest paid in Lisbon; their maximum is $1.10
a day for motormen. The average wage for Portugal is far less
than in America, the hours are long, and prices in general are as
high. The attendants at the National Archives receive twelve
dollars a month. Public-school teachers begin with thirty cents
a day, which is gradually raised, after twenty years' service, to
a dollar a day. "How can we teach when the walls of our
stomachs are grinding together!" exclaimed a young teacher, in
explaining why the percentage of illiteracy in Portugal is between
70 and So. When a deputation waited upon Dom Joao Franco
with the teachers' grievances, that much harassed statesman
replied, "Let them plant potatoes. "
The Portuguese lower classes live on bread, codfish, string
beans, and wine. The wine, the one cheap article of this diet,
costs eight cents a litre, and must be execrable, though I have
never found anyone who had ever tasted it. Wheat and codfish
are largely imported and since IS92 have paid an iniquitously
heavy tariff, that on wheat being 60 per cent. The other two
pay a heavy octroi upon entering Lisbon. The octroi alone
amounts to more than six dollars per capita per annum, of which
40 per cent. is consumed in the collection. Owing partly to these
tariffs, the price of foodstuffs has nearly doubled during the past
twenty years. This is one of the causes of the downfall of the
monarchy. They are still rising, and may yet wreck the republic.
Abused patience leads to fury. At the revolution the depths
were stirred. The prohibition of strikes having been removed,
there occurred an epidemic of them similar to that in Russia in
the autumn of 1905. At one time there were in Lisbon one
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hundred strikes in progress. 'J Twenty-four new ones were announced in a single day. They involved everything from the
leading industries-the railways, the tramways, the lighting systems-down to the humblest employments. The washerwomen
refused to wash, having conceived the idea that the social order
was about to be inverted and that they would by this simple
process be brought to the top, with palaces to live in. "Perhaps
you will be washing for me, " said one of them shyly to a lady of
my acquaintance. The Lisbon proletariat suddenly assumed a
noticeably less deferential manner toward their superiors.
Having New York standards in mind, I was at first at a loss to
understand the horror with which this change was mentioned,
for Lisbon manners seemed to me still fairly idyllic; but after
meeting the peasants, I could see that the people of the towns
had lost something. Even now, as the porter or attendant
rises at your approach and stands respectfully as long as he can
catch a glimpse of your august presence, you reflect that this is a
part of the old Chesterfieldian order, destined speedily to disappear. The Portuguese are still, however, one of the politest
people in Europe.
We have now reached the seamy side of the revolution. Mob
violence was 'for a time rampant. Yet few heads were broken,
and, apart from the wrecking of the offices of certain plain-speaking newspapers, not much property was destroyed. The Portuguese are neither vicious nor always courageous. A Lisbon
mob, ragged, largely barefooted, and wonderfully odorous, is not
really formidable and readily respects a show of force.
These outbreaks were nevertheless sufficiently alarming to
those against whom they were directed. Those who could, left
the country. Those who could not, left Lisbon. Owners of
property began to ask if this was the fruit of the new teaching.
Many leading republicans, forgetting that revolutions are rough
work, and disappointed to find their roseate dreams not immediately realised, retired from politics or became apostate. In
Lisbon society the republic is wholly anathema. To defend it
would be to lose caste. The large English colony, whose property was specially threatened, is against it to a man. Americans
should not be expected, it seems to me, to sympathise with the
new order merely on the ground that it is a question of monarchy
or republic. In these days of universal parliaments the old
distinction is assuming a new meaning. Monarchy is becoming
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little more than the rallying point of certain conservative forces,
and one's attitude toward the revolution will depend less upon
the old political distinctions than upon one's newer social and
religious prejudices.
I have said that the Lisbon working classes lack cohesion and
are incapable of organisation. There is one aspect of the revolution which leads one to ask whether this statement can be true.
I refer to the remarkable rele played by a secret political society
known as the carbonarios. It may be admitted that a secret
society is not a high form of political association; but all agree
that the carbonarios have shown remarkable efficiency, which is at
least a sign of cohesion. This society, whose numbers, organisation, and membership can be only vaguely surmised, is popularly
supposed to consist of about ten thousand men, grouped in
blocks of five, only one of whom knows the identity of any member outside. Possibly this was its early form, when secrecy was
so necessary. According to common report they are the minutemen of the republic, an informal secret police ready at a moment's
notice to instigate or to suppress a riot, to wreck a monarchist
rising before it is fairly launched, and to act as spies and secret
accusers against the enemies of the republic. Dr. Affonso Costa,
the one strong man of the republic, whom the monarchists execrate as the embodiment of the prince of darkness, is said to lean
upon them for support. He is even suspected of being controlled
by them. The extreme monarchist view is that this small
minority, the very offscourings of humanity, is now ruling the
great majority through secret accusation and terror. I do not
know in how far this is true nor could I discover what proportion
of the society is composed of workingmen.
It is true, however, that espionage and arbitrary imprisonment are causing something like a reign of terror in Lisbon.
Opponents of the government who discuss political questions in
public places do so apprehensively, in undertones. It is also true
that there has been much monarchist plotting. There was little
bloodletting at the revolution. The monarchists were merely
surprised. It is only natural that they should hope to regain
power in the manner they lost it. All their efforts so far, however,
have been worse than failures. They have served merely to fill
the prisons. The government's method of repression has recently been deeply discredited by the discovery that the last
monarchist plot was not only, like some of the others, betrayed
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by the secret police, but was actually instigated by them, after
the worst Russian example. The government's treatment of
political prisoners has from the first attracted unfavourable
attention abroad, especially in England. The subject is one of
bitter controversy, upon which it is difficult to speak with confidence; but a few notorious cases have occurred in which the
accused have been imprisoned for long periods without trial,
contrary to Portuguese law; and from detailed descriptions of a
republican lawyer engaged in the defence of political prisoners,
I am persuaded that many of the prisoners have had only the
travesty of a trial, partly because of the bias, inexperience, and
unfitness of the new revolutionary judges. No distinction is
made between the political prisoners and ordinary criminals, who
are confined together. This is defended on the ground that the
political prisoners have exceeded the bounds of even military
opposition. Not content with appealing to arms, they have tried
to secure foreign intervention, and must therefore be classed not
as political prisoners but as traitors. It is also said in defence of
the prisons that they are in no worse condition than under the
monarchy. Unfortunately, this is saying little.
The treatment of political prisoners and the religious question
are the two sources of widespread bitterness in this revolution.
"Politics are a dirty business, mamma, " wrote a Portuguese
young lady recently, after marrying into a political family. So
they are, not only in Portugal, but everywhere, especially in
times of revolution. There never was a glorious revolution-or
a glorious reaction.
II

I have tried to show that the Portuguese revolution is essentially a struggle between social classes. It is now necessary to
retrace our steps and to discuss its anti-monarchical and anticlerical phases; for it is also a revolt against the monarchy and
the Church. The misgovernment of the monarchy will be made
sufficiently clear if we confine our attention to that pulse of the
body politic, the administration of finances. The manner in
which a state collects and spends its funds is a sufficient test of
its efficiency and character.
In speaking of the misgovernment of the monarchy, we do not
mean the monarchy alone so much as the ancient regime, which
was parliamentary. The deplorable state of the Portuguese
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finances is chiefly the work of the rotative parties of the Cortes,
differing as parties so often do in no essential principle. The defect of the crown was not misrule but failure to rule at all. The
house of Braganga has not been one of strong, purposeful personalities. John IV., the first of the line, was inactive and unenterprising. He would never have accepted the crown but for
the superior intelligence and energy of his wife. His descendants,
who have inherited only too many of his qualities, have never
appealed strongly to the popular imagination. English people
sometimes say proudly, "We English love our royalties"; the
Portuguese have been lukewarm toward theirs. Neither King
Carlos nor Queen Amelie was popular, and the former was the
victim of innumerable libellous attacks which were widely believed. Monarchists have told me that at the revolution few
regretted the monarchy as such.
There was a popular but quite erroneous impression that the
financial disorders of the state were due to the extravagance of
the Court. Maria Pia's jewels, the Pena, Ajuda, and Necessidades
palaces have played a r6le in popular imagination similar to the
diamond necklace and amusements of Marie Antoinette. Their
importance has been greatly exaggerated. The Portuguese civil
list was in truth too small to maintain the court with dignity.
The crown was constantly in debt to the state through illegal
advances known as adeantamentos. Its affairs were amiably and
loosely administered; and this in the face of modern democracy is
fatal. A certain court official is said to have held eighteen offices
at one time. The fault was. not royal extravagance so much as
the evaporation of the funds before they reached the king's
hands. The court did not set an example of strict accountability,
and like the state was constantly on the verge of bankruptcy.
As for Portuguese finances they are indescribable. The
national debt has risen in fifty years, without wars or other
national crises, to be one of the largest in Europe in proportion to
population. M. Marvaud gives the following comparative figures
of national indebtedness: Russia, 156 francs per capita,. AustriaHungary, 323; Italy, 400; Spain, 475; Portugal, 750. The taxes
are larger per capita than those of the world powers, Great Britain, France, or Germany, whose wealth is incomparably greater.
The depth of this tragedy becomes apparent only when one
realises that there is little to show for the expenditure. As a
military power Portugal is not formidable, even in proportion to

260

THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY

its size. The navy seldom leaves its anchorage and is said to be
unseaworthy. The army is better, but not perfectly equipped.
The railways, roads, and other means of communication have
cost great sums; b}Jt they are inferior and entirely inadequate.
Few governments have done so little for the national wealth, for
trade, agriculture, or social improvements. The natural resources
are undeveloped. The colonies lie dormant. The elementary
schools are pitiful. According to a statement made by a deputy
in the Cortes in 1897, a very large proportion of this crushing
indebtedness is due merely to an accumulation of annual deficits,
which in tum are due chiefly to leakage in the collection and
expenditure of the public funds. There are few nations whose
financial history is more deeply tragic.
If you ask a Portuguese how such things can possibly be, he
will answer in exactly the words we use in America in trying to
explain away our own political corruption-"the politicians."
Unfortunately this is no explanation in either case. It is a hard
truth, but the politicians of every country reflect the national
character. Nearly everything that one disapproves of in Portugal may be said to rise from two sources: first, to what the economists call the law of diminishing returns, which explains its
poverty; second, to the blight of imperialism, which explains its
disorganisation and corruption. Portugal was for centuries the
centre of a rich empire that drained her of men as she drained it
of wealth. With a stream of treasure flowing in upon her it
was impossible to maintain the old Portuguese virtues. Thrift,
abstemiousness, and vigor gave way to looseness and corruption. A non-mercantile nation can draw profits from a colonial
empire only as Spain and Portugal have done, by administrative
and fiscal exploitation; and this reacts disastrously upon the
mother country. The richer Portuguese colonies have been lost;
the habits remain.
A serious crisis came in 1892. National bankruptcy was
temporarily averted by arbitrarily lowering the interest on the
national debt and imposing numerous new taxes, including those
heavy tariffs which so ruinously increased the price of food. It
was of little avail, for the annual deficits continued. In 1907 it
was clear that drastic reform and a revolution were the only alternatives. Following numerous precedents, King Carlos reverted
to a dictatorship and entrusted all the power of the state to Dom
Joao Franco, who unfortunately proved unequal to the heavy
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task imposed upon him. He began impetuously enough. The
Cortes was dissolved sine die, and numerous salutary reforms were
instituted by arbitrary decree. The scandalously numerous
sinecures were vigorously attacked, improved methods of finance
were inaugurated, and the deficit was greatly reduced. It was
a promising beginning. The opposition to these necessary but
illegal measures was naturally bitter; but it is noteworthy that the
old rotative parties, which were nominally monarchist, were as
unmanageable as the republicans. The monarchy was a house
divided against itself. Franco met agitation with repression.
Newspapers were suppressed, municipalities coerced. Hundreds
of his political opponents were arrested and preparations were
made to deport them to the colonies without trial upon the simple
order of three magistrates named for this purpose. Among these
prisoners was Dr. Affonso Costa, who learned the art of political
repression from personal experience under the monarchy.
On February 1,1908, while the passions of this conflict were
at their height, the royal family was unwisely permitted to drive
through the streets of Lisbon unguarded. Near the corner of the
Praga do Commercio, the royal coach was fired upon at close
range by men concealed under the arches. The King and his
eldest son, the heir-apparent, were instantly killed in the presence
of Queen Amelie and Manoel. I t would have been better if the
monarchy could have ended with this tragedy. It would have
been dignified and consecrated by a pathos and heroism that was
later lacking. The two short years of King Manoel's troubled
reign, with its dissolving ministries, its court intrigues, its meanness, mismanagement, and treason, merely served to show that
the monarchy was bankrupt politically, as well as financially.
The reforms of Franco were speedily undone, but no new law was
passed during this reign. The young King was inexperienced and
unnerved. The old parties renewed their senseless struggles, with
apparently no suspicion that the ground beneath them was
completely undermined. The revolution would have come earlier,
but prudence required a decent interval of time to avoid the
appearance of founding the republic upon an assassination.
The explosion came on October 5, 1910. The conspirators
had won over the navy, which opened fire upon the Necessidades
Palace. It was in part a military conspiracy like the Turkish
revolution, though the troops were divided. An unpaid soldiery
is a poor defence. The fighting, if one can call it fighting, was
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extremely confused. I have talked with many eye witnesses, but
they saw little and that little they did not know the meaning of.
A body of republican troops barricaded the upper end of the
Avenida, and the marks of their shell fire are still to be seen in
that fine boulevard; but what they were firing at is a matter of
some uncertainty. According to best informed opinion, only
about seventy-five persons were killed, many of whom were noncombatants. A few ardent patriots have persuaded themselves
that it was a gallant affair; others are of the opinion that both
sides ran away. No one could tell what was happening. A
naval officer committed suicide at the moment of victory, supposing that all was lost. The victory consisted in the flight of the
King from the Necessidades-whether in terror or under compulsion, whether in the Spanish ambassador's car, with or without
the connivance of the repUblican leaders, it is hardly worth while
to inquire. Everyone has his own story. The important point
is that the power had slipped from listless hands, almost without
a struggle.
III
The republican provisional government had hardly been
installed before it began with feverish activity, without waiting
for an election or the calling of the Cortes, to issue innumerable
revolutionary decrees covering an astonishing range of subjects.
They were of course as illegal as anything Franco had done, but
a new era had been proclaimed and it was necessary to make an
immediate showing. It is worth while to mention a few changes
of a trivial character because they show the spirit of the new
regime and the source of its inspiration.
To exhibit the republic in the character of an intellectual
illumination, the new French method of indicating the hours of
the day by numbers up to twenty-four was adopted, and the
spelling of the Portuguese language was simplified and phoneticised. Unfortunately, there was no time to consult the Brazilians,
who continue the old spelling, thus creating in a measure two
Portuguese languages. A new flag was adopted, red and green,
the positivists' colours, an astonishing procedure to those who
look upon the flag as a national rather than a party emblem. The
national holidays were reduced in number and renamed after
military and literary personages in place of saints; not altogether
to the pleasure of the unillumined populace, who imagined that

THE REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL

263

a new set of obscure saints was being foisted upon them. "Why,"
they exclaimed, "we never even heard of Saint Camoes! " Streets
and squares bearing the names of saints have been renamed, some
of them in honour of republican newspapers. The word king
having become obsolete, the coinage was altered to avoid speaking of reis. The shopkeepers, with more zeal than knowledge,
followed suit by' calling their Christmas cakes bolos nacionaes
instead of bolos reis, forgetting that they were named in memory
of the Magi, not of the Bragangas. Acrimonious disputes were
waged between irate monarchists and stubborn shopkeepers as
to whether bolo real and bolo nacional could possibly refer to the
same thing: a completely different outlook upon the world was
indicated by an affirmative or negative answer to that silly question. It is even said that a man named King felt impelled to
change the name of his hotel; whereupon he had no end of trouble
with mischievous monarchists inquiring after the vanished
establishment and trying to engage apartments in it.
These changes, whose Gallic origin is obvious, have been much
criticised, especially by the English residents, as frivolous beyond
measure; but at least they make a deep impression at a trifling
expenditure of energy. They create the desired illusion of great
changes. To the monarchists they are as gall and wormwood.
No monarchists could be induced to adopt the new spelling, to
speak of Rua de Sao Roque as Rua Mundo, or of the Rato as
Praga de Brazil. Thus a man's very mode of speech proclaims
his politics. As long as social relations remain, as at present,
impossible between members of the opposing parties, this is not
altogether an inconvenience.
The provisional government did not, however, confine its
attention merely to surface things. Without authorisation from
any source, it did not hesitate to take in hand so difficult and
thorny a question as the relations between church and state. Only
five days after the revolution it expelled the religious orders upon
twenty-four hours' notice. It was a stringent measure roughly
enforced. Shortly after, church and state were separated, not by
concordat or by formal legislation, but by simple administrative
decree. Catholicism is no longer the religion of the state. All
religious bodies are on an equal footing. The vast church
property was nationalised, though the congregations are permitted the free use of the edifices. Churches must hereafter be
supported by free alms, except for the state pension provided for
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present incumbents during the remainder of their lives. It is
even provided that they may marry, and provision has been
made for the support of wives and children who may survive
them. The schools are secularised and there is to be no religious
instruction in them. Cemeteries are secularised. Religious
oaths were abolished. Other decrees facilitated divorce and
changed the marriage laws in a sense extremely repugnant to
Catholic teaching. Yet, strange to say, the church was not to be
entirely free, for the state retained a certain supervision over
church finances and appointments. The law is in fact rather
more severe than that of France; and no one looks upon France
as exactly the home of political moderation.
I must confess to a certain degree of anti-clerical prejudice as
a result of my few months' stay in Portugal; but I cannot forbear criticising these decrees, not so much on the ground of
abstract theory; as of political expediency. They correspond to
no pressing need of Portuguese society, and they outrage quite
gratuitously the most cherished ideals of a majority of the Portuguese people. It is true that there is a deep hostility to the
clergy in certain classes of Lisbon, Oporto, Santarem, and many
other towns, which produced extraordinary scenes during the
first days of the revolution. The lack of looting at that time is
by some attributed to the fact that the rabble was so busy chasing
priests. A church tower near the Palacio das C~rtes in Lisbon
was riddled by bullets and another church, Santos, was the scene
of a spectacular fusillade at night, with its white towers beautifully illuminated by the searchlights of the fleet riding nearby
in the Tagus. There were wild rumours that the priests had
opened fire from these towers, that the city was undermined with
secret passageways, and that the priests intended as a last resort
to blow it up rather than surrender their authority. Even now
a priest who meets a procession of schoolchildren under the convoy of their teacher may be greeted with shrill derisive cries of
"Jesuit." During my stay there two years after the revolution,
a priest was stoned by schoolchildren. Yet Portugal as a whole,
especially in the country, is Catholic. Even in the towns the
hostility was directed chiefly against the foreign religious orders,
which had increased during recent years and were in high favour
at court. This is said to be the source of Queen Amelie's unpopularity. The Jesuits were specially feared on account of their
political activity, and the dislike for the orders was shared to a
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certain extent by the secular clergy themselves. As for the latter,
they were apathetic, like the society they lived in. Their education was narrowly religious and did not attempt to prepare them
for leadership in ordinary practical affairs. They were ill-paid.
There was no system of promotion and little supervision. There
was no incentive. They were left to stagnate in their little
parishes, without the association of a resident gentry or a bourgeoisie. Their life was quite different from that of an English
country curate, or an American country clergyman. If some of
them through isolation and idleness fell into evil ways, it lost
nothing in the telling by the republican press, which had a keen
sense for clerical and court scandal. The church in Portugal
was not in a condition to weather a storm. It had identified
itself with a. political party or perhaps one should say with the
government, and now shares its fate. But to declare war upon
it, without provocation as far as the secular clergy are concerned,
was singularly unwise. The bishops are in exile for resisting, not
the new regime, but the new law. The parish priests, after much
hesitation and pressure from their superiors, have for the most
part refused the pensions, which means that they are nearly
destitute. This is the most serious and most obvious mistake the
republican leaders have made. They have wantonly created one
of their most difficult problems, and in the end the results may
prove fatal.
What has the future in store for the republic and for Portugal ? Well informed resident foreigners take a gloomy view, and
commonly predict bankruptcy and intervention. Portugal, they
say, is a second Egypt. A Kitchener, backed by foreign troops,
could take a short cut out of all their difficulties by abolishing
useless public offices in a wholesale manner, and by selling the
colonies. A politician dependent upon public opinion can hardly
do either. I cannot persuade myself, however, that foreign
intervention, always a possibility, is either imminent or desirable.
As for the republic, Affonso Costa finds himself confronted
with Cromwell's insoluble problem, how to make the revolution,
which was the work of a small minority, acceptable to the nation
as a whole. How can a thinly veiled dictatorship be changed
into a republic reflecting the will of the majority, when the
majority is monarchist? In the important towns the republicans
probably have a majority, and what is more important, are still
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united. The moment they form factions, like the Spanish republicans, the end will have come. Already there are ominous signs.
The editor of a republican paper, who is in receipt of a pension
as one of the founders of the republic, recently saw his printing
establishment smashed by a still more republican mob. In the
country it is impossible to make the peasants understand what a
republic is. The government has spent considerable sums in a
republican propaganda, with meagre results. A young republican who had taken part in this work told me his experiences.
Some of the peasants thought the wages of Portugal were paid
by the King. "Why did they kill him?" they asked. "He was a
good man. He always paid us. " "How can such people have
any conception what a republic is!" he exclaimed despairingly.
Political abstractions certainly will not move them. Nor have
they profited like the French peasants by a spoliation of the landlords. The revolution has done little for them, and they are
emigrating in ever increasing numbers. In the end, this will, no
doubt, raise the standard of living of those who remain and will
act as a dissolvent of their fatal passivity. Meanwhile, they cannot be won over to the republic, and they will not fight for the
monarchy. The fate of the republic, which is a republic only
in name, rests at present with the lower classes of Lisbon.
The future of Portugal is involved in its pressing financial
problem, which is grave but not yet hopeless. If the Portuguese
could but persuade themselves to part with their colonies, those
last links with a glorious but ruinous past! It is these colonies,
the rich but undeveloped remnants of a vastly richer empire,
which give to the revolution its international importance. Great
Britain and Germany, to say nothing of other great powers, are
deeply interested in their fate; but as long as international relations remain, as at present, somewhat unsatisfactory, it would be
disquieting to raise the question of their partition. England has
for centuries occupied a position somewhat approaching a protector~te over Portuga1.
Ever since the time of Cromwell the
two countries have been yoked in an unequal alliance, and England has guaranteed the Portuguese colonies. Even before
Cromwell's time, there were large societies of English merchants
at Lisbon, Oporto, and elsewhere, who now form an important
element in the commercial life of those cities. The tramways,
the lighting systems, and the telephones have passed into their
efficient hands after Portuguese companies have made a failure
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of them. They have become so profitable that there is a great
outcry of foreign exploitation, and they were favourite objects of
mob violence during the early days of the revolution. The revolution was unwelcome to the British government in many ways, but
it nevertheless confined its action to a vigorous protection of its
subjects and their threatened property-the exact antithesis to
our humiliating and disastrous policy in Mexico. As a result,
the British are feared, respected, and unmolested. No other
government, not even Spain, which is so deeply disturbed by this
neighbouring object lesson in republicanism and revolution, dares
intervene without English consent, and that consent England
shows no sign of giving. We may therefore expect in the absence
of untoward events that the Portuguese will be left to determine
their future without foreign interference; but that future is
in the lap of the gods.
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